This article studies how different types of tolerance and perceived threat affect opinions about the EU immigration policy in Germany and the Netherlands. We assess to what extent social and political tolerance for and sociotropic and personal threats from Muslim immigrants influence EU citizens’ beliefs that immigration is one of the most important issues facing the EU. By experimentally manipulating religion of immigrant, level of perceived threat, and type of tolerance, we examine how people’s attitudes on immigration policies change. Our findings shed light on how EU countries might deal with the rising tide of intolerance toward immigrants and Muslims, and how better policies of integration could be implemented in a multicultural Europe.
This article analyzes how uncertainty about the location of the pivotal actor influences the outcome of Commission proposals. We argue that the Commission is an imperfect agenda-setter and expect that Commission proposals are more likely to fail when uncertainty increases in the bicameral legislature of the Council and the European Parliament. Considering all legislative acts decided under the co-decision procedure proposed in the period from November 1993 until December 2009, we focus on withdrawal of Commission proposals as failures. In the empirical analysis we distinguish between electoral and procedural uncertainty and provide evidence that both types of uncertainty explain withdrawal of Commission proposals.
This study introduces a population-ecological approach to the entry and exit of political parties. A primary proposition of population ecology is that organizational entry and exit depends on the number of organizations already present: that is, density. We propose that political parties mainly experience competition from parties in the same ideological niche (left, centre, right). Pooled time-series analyses of 410 parties, 263 elections and 18 West-European countries largely support our expectations. We find that political parties are more likely to exit when density within their niche increases. Also there is competition between adjacent ideological niches, i.e. between centrist and right-wing niches. In contrast to our expectations, neither density nor institutional rules impact party entry. This raises important questions about the rationale of prospective entrants.
We ask how pro-European parties communicate in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge and how this affects the politicization of European Union integration within a country. We draw on a quantitative content analysis of parties’ press releases issued in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections in seven countries. Our results show that pro-European parties as such put Europe on the agenda, debate issues similar to those voiced by Eurosceptics and defend their pro-European positions: yet, they do so to varying degrees and with major exceptions. It is pro-European catch-all parties with strong internal dissent that silence Europe and choose blurring or adoption strategies. Consequently, the politicization of European integration varies among countries, thereby high topic visibility is accompanied by low levels of party conflict.
This article argues that external factors of EU coverage in the media need to be reassessed against domestic factors, in particular how parties modulate media attention to EU affairs. We explain which parties may set the EU on the media agenda, and how parties interact with events depending on the level of conflict over EU issues. Drawing on the first long-term analysis of partisan agenda-setting of EU affairs in the media – based on ARIMA time-series models of monthly data collected for six newspapers from 1990 to 2015 – we determine the scale of partisan agenda-setting and find partial support for our model. Political parties do not face the intrusion of EU issues, but some of them are actively involved in this process.
The scrutiny exerted by opposition parties in European Union (EU) affairs crucially contributes to the functioning of democratic accountability in the EU. While our knowledge about the extent of control activities has increased, we know little about their content. This article investigates the policy issues that opposition parties address in parliamentary questions about the EU. I argue that Eurosceptic opposition parties follow vote-maximizing strategies and selectively scrutinize very general aspects of the EU. My expectation is tested using a unique data collection of written questions in the Danish Folketing (1973–2013). I find evidence that the content of questions has been broadened over time and that Eurosceptic parties strongly emphasize general EU matters. The results point to the importance of political parties in making democratic accountability in the EU work.
This article compares the effectiveness and the fairness of four alternative policies aimed at managing multilingual communication in the European Union. The current multilingual regime, based on the formal equality among the official languages of the European Union Member States disenfranchises only a small percentage of residents. On the contrary, an English-only language policy would exclude 45% to 79% of adult residents in the 25 countries for which data are available, depending on the indicator used. A language regime based on English, French and German would disenfranchise 26% to 49% of residents, whereas a regime based on six languages would bring the shares of the excluded population down to 9–18%. In addition, results show that economically and socially disadvantaged individuals are less likely to speak languages other than their own native tongue, and therefore they are much more likely to be adversely affected if the European Union stops using their language. The current full multilingual policy of the European Union based on translation and interpreting not only is (and will be for the foreseeable future) the most effective language policy among the alternatives examined; it is also the only one that is truly inclusive at a relatively reasonable cost. The British withdrawal from the European Union is likely to increase rather than decrease the importance of a multilingual language policy.
How much and why do political parties emphasize Europe in election campaigns? The literature is increasingly focusing on two aspects of party issue competition: position and salience. However, recent studies on salience tend to ignore the fact that Europe is a compound political issue. This article contributes to the debate by highlighting the crucial difference between constitutive and policy-related European issues. Using data from the Euromanifestos Project for 14 EU member states for the period 1979–2009, we first show that Europe is much more salient in European Parliament elections than previously assumed. Second, EU issue salience depends on party position and party system polarization over European integration. However, different explanations come into play once we bring in the polity-vs.-policy distinction. This has important implications for our understanding of party competition on European integration.
Issue evolution is a well-established theoretical perspective in the analysis of long-term party competition and partisanship in the US. However, this perspective has rarely been used to analyze political elite effects on partisan polarization in European multiparty systems. Consequently, I apply the issue evolution perspective to polarization in a European multiparty system. I find an emergence of cultural issues in Denmark, where mass level polarization on cultural issues followed elite level polarization. Unlike two-party systems, niche parties drive issue evolution on the elite level, which is then followed by niche partisan polarization and, finally, mainstream party adaption. The findings illustrate the mechanisms of issue evolution in a European-style multiparty system and the role of niche parties.
What regional factors can explain the heterogeneity in Structural Funds distribution to European Union regions? Past studies have shown that aside from the level of economic development and rates of unemployment, other political, and economic factors systematically explain why certain European Union regions receive greater funding than others, in particular where there is room for bargaining. In this article, a novel theory is posited which argues that the determination of Structural Funds is based on an interaction between a region’s formal institutions (the level of a regional autonomy) and informal institutions (its level of quality of government). In cases of low regional autonomy, member states and European Union level actors prefer to allocate greater levels of Funds to regions with lower quality of government in order to increase cohesion. Yet in cases of high regional autonomy, risks associated with absorption failure in lower capacity regions lead states to strategically allocate greater levels of transfers to regions with higher quality of government. The theory is tested on data for 171 European Union regions for the 2007–2013 budget period. The results show robust empirical support for the theoretical claims.
The European Commission has proposed a refugee distribution key, which yields respective quotas for European Union/European Free Trade Association member states. It is based on four quantities: GDP, population, asylum applications per capita in the past, and unemployment rates. I show that the given distribution key has properties which contradict the European Commission’s intentions. Exemplarily, states with low (high) unemployment may experience a lower (higher) quota when unemployment is taken into account compared to when it is not. These deviations are single-digit percentages. As a remedy, I propose an alternative distribution key, which avoids the undesired properties. It is modeled in the spirit of the European Commission’s proposal and is based on the same four quantities. Deviations between the two distribution keys are up to two-digit percentages.
Little firm knowledge exists about the allocation of the Council's political attention across policy areas and over time. This article presents a new dataset of the date, duration, and policy coding of more than 70,000 meetings of Council working parties, covering all areas of the Council's policy activities between 1995 and 2014. In terms of both scope and resolution, the data allow for the generation of unprecedented insights into what issues occupy the Council's agenda, how that varies between and within policy areas, and how that changes over time. After discussing conceptual issues and explaining the construction of the dataset, the article demonstrates its usefulness and versatility through analyses of the Council's political attention at various levels of aggregation.
Since the early 1990s, European integration has become increasingly differentiated. Analysing the conditions under which member states make use of the opportunity to opt out of, or exclude other countries from, European integration, we argue that different explanations apply to treaty and accession negotiations, respectively. Threatening to block deeper integration, member states with strong national identities secure differentiations in treaty reform. In enlargement, in turn, old member states fear economic disadvantages and low administrative capacity and therefore impose differentiation on poor newcomers. Opt-outs from treaty revisions are limited to the area of core state powers, whereas they also occur in the market in the context of enlargement.
A superordinate identity improves intergroup relations and bolsters support for the political system. Yet, why do only some identify superordinately? I argue that personality is an important determinant. I test this using an original survey in the United Kingdom, where European Union integration has increased the salience and feasibility of the "European" identity option in addition to a national one. Several Big Five traits matter: openness and extraversion increase identification with Europe while agreeableness decreases it. Mediation analysis subsequently shows that personality’s effects also travel through the mechanisms of risk aversion, knowledge, and ideology. Results imply that certain predispositions prompt some to be more receptive than others to seeing themselves in superordinate terms and that European identification may be at least partly more primordial than previously thought.
This article investigates the extent to which restrictive asylum and visa policies trigger an unintended behavioural response of potential and rejected asylum seekers. Based on our analysis of bilateral asylum and visa policies on migrant flows to 29 European states in the 2000s, we find evidence of a significant deflection into irregularity at work. Our estimates suggest that a 10% increase in asylum rejections raises the number of irregular migrants by on average 2% to 4%, and similarly, a 10% increase in short-stay visa rejections leads to a 4% to 7% increase in irregular border entries. We identify significant nuances in the impact of restrictive asylum and visa policies on the number of apprehensions ‘at the border’ versus ‘on territory’.
This study examines those factors that influence the issuance of reasoned opinions within the European Union’s ‘Early Warning System’. It is posited that greater aggregate public Euroskepticism results in the issuance of more reasoned opinions. This expectation is tested using data derived from the European Parliament, the Commission’s platform for European Union Interparliamentary Exchange, and longitudinal data from the Eurobarometer survey series. It is found that greater aggregate public Euroskepticism is associated with the issuance of more reasoned opinions. This study has important implications for our understandings of policy processes, political responsiveness, and democratic governance in the European Union and its member states.
Increasingly, research on attitudes towards the European project focuses on transnational practices. This article furthers the transnational approach by offering the first systematic analysis of how domestic transnationalism – i.e. transnational practices conducted in the home country – influences the formation of pro-European sentiments. We argue that domestic transnational activities foster recognition of common, transnational interests and identities that support the European integration project. Using a 2013 Eurobarometer, we show the distinct need to pay attention to domestic transnationalism. Individuals engaging in more domestic transnational activities display more pro-European sentiments in four of our five dependent variables. Moreover, the effect of domestic transnationalism is particularly intense among less-educated citizens.
The effects of electoral rules on party systems have been well known since Duverger first proposed his famous law. Often considered ‘second order’ in terms of issues and voting behaviour, many European Parliament elections are held under different electoral rules to national elections. This article examines the consequences of these differences and hypothesizes that where a more permissive electoral system is used for European Parliament elections, the size of the party system at European Parliament elections will grow towards what we would expect from the European Parliament electoral rules in isolation, and that this will lead to a subsequent growth in the size of the national party system. Using multi-level mixed-effect growth curve modelling support is found for both these hypotheses.
The inclusion of 11 new member states from the former Eastern bloc constitutes a significant challenge to the European Union in various respects. Many worry that whatever tenuous ‘European identity’ existed prior to the eastern enlargement, it has now become so diluted that no meaningful European political community can form. We provide an empirical account of the state of European identity after the eastern enlargement through a comparative analysis of affective and cognitive European identity in the old and the new Central and Eastern European member states. Our empirical analyses indicate that while the overall levels of cognitive European identification in the East are indeed lower than in the West, citizens from new member states are just as attached to Europe as citizens from old member states. Most importantly, not only is there no discernable difference in cognitive identification among young Europeans in East and West, but the youngest in the East seem to be even more strongly attached to Europe than their peers in the West.
This article analyses the impact of electoral institutions on the re-election campaigning and outreach strategies of Members of the European Parliament on the Twitter social media platform. Social media offers politicians a means to contact voters remotely and at low cost. We test the effect of diverse national proportional representation electoral institutions in European elections on a possible online electoral connection. We draw upon an original dataset of Members of the European Parliament Twitter activity before, during, and after the 2014 European elections. Our results confirm that variation in electoral institutions leads to meaningful differentiation in representatives' social media campaigning, which is further affected by national party, voter and legislator characteristics. Representatives make constructive use of Twitter, but there is no sustained online electoral connection.
Many academics and commentators argue that Europe is suffering from a democratic deficit. An interesting proposal that has been put forward to address this problem is to elect some members of the European parliament in a pan-European district. In this article, we evaluate this proposal using an online experiment, in which thousands of Europeans voted on a pan-European ballot we created. We find that the voting behaviour of European citizens would be strongly affected by the presence or absence of candidates from their own country on the lists. If a pan-European district is created, our findings provide an argument in favour of using a closed-list ballot and establishing a maximum number of candidates from each country on the lists.
Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency – the publication of legislative records – works to overcome problems of incomplete information. We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014 and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations. On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help facilitate decision-making as it increases credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.
Is there—or could there be—a Europe-wide public sphere? Some argue that one already exists, others that none is attainable. This debate turns on what it means to have one—on how much (and what kinds of) cross-border ‘discussion’ and public input it must entail. An ambitious European public sphere would involve more truly Europe-wide collective will formation and political accountability. This article attempts to move beyond speculation, with a discussion on an ambitious version of a European public sphere. Participants' opinions and vote intentions in Europolis were gauged before and after deliberating. This enables us to probe a double counterfactual: what if there was a more ambitious European public sphere, and what if European Parliamentary elections were consequently more deliberative.
Though the impact of deliberative polling on attitude change has received ample attention in the literature, micro models of attitude change before, during, and after deliberation are understudied. The relative strength of three competing views of the way attitudes change—the heuristics, systematic, and deliberative models—is assessed, using the quasi-experimental data of the EuroPolis deliberative project and comparing a group of people who participated in the deliberative poll with a control group. The results are: (1) in line with the systematic model, predispositions play a larger role than in the heuristics or deliberative models; (2) predispositions play a different role for participants and nonparticipants; (3) predispositions shape attitude formation in different ways depending on the issue at hand. On some issues the beliefs of participants change as a consequence of deliberation and become more complex and nuanced than before. This is, however, not the case for immigration issues where deliberation seems to strengthen predispositions.
Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material resources a group possesses: we expect the difference between business and non-business groups to be largest for actors that are well endowed with material resources. Using novel data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The article has implications for the literatures on lobbying, Europeanization, and theories of European integration.
This article assesses the effects of deliberation and increased political knowledge on vote choice. The observed knowledge gains result from participation in a deliberative experiment in the context of second-order elections, which facilitates realistic estimates of information gains that can be expected if citizens were politically more engaged than they actually are. Using survey data on 333 participants in the deliberative experiment and 729 respondents from a control group, we find that deliberation is associated with significant changes in vote choice. Specifically, participating in the deliberative event is related to an increased likelihood of vote switching in favour of Green parties. However, there is no support for the expectation that changes in citizens’ party choices are related to the observed increase in political knowledge.
What effect do online public consultations have on legislative duration in the European Union? While scholars are divided on whether consultations speed things up or slow things down, they agree that consultations affect how decision-makers think about legislative proposals. I argue that this is only part of the story: the impact of consultations on legislation duration is also a function of the administrative capacity of decision-makers and their staff to process consultation submissions. I test this argument using a unique data set of over 750 legislative proposals in the period 2009–2013. I find that consultations tend to have a negative impact on the time it takes to pass legislation. However, this negative effect is less pronounced when decision-makers have sufficient administrative capacity to process submissions.
From a normative vantage point, post-deliberative opinions should be linked to the quality of arguments presented during discussion. Yet, there is a dearth of research testing this claim. Our study makes a first attempt to overcome this deficiency. By analyzing a European deliberative poll on third country migration, we explore whether statements backed by reason affect opinions, which we term deliberative persuasion. We contrast deliberative persuasion to non-deliberative persuasion, whereby we explore whether the most frequently repeated position influences opinions. We find that with regard to regularization of irregular immigrants, deliberative persuasion took place. In the context of European involvement in immigration affairs, however, opinions are driven by the most frequently repeated position rather than by the quality of argumentation.
A superordinate identity reduces bias and facilitates intergroup cooperation. This suggests that getting European Union (EU) citizens to identify with Europe will decrease outgroup hostility. Is European identity thus a superordinate identity? Using Eurobarometer data, I determine which level of identification is the most inclusive for individuals' immigration attitudes. Those who feel European hold more favorable views toward immigrants—an effect that is amplified under conditions of cross-cutting cleavages and where country length of European Union membership is greatest. In contrast, strong national identity is associated with more negative immigration attitudes; regional identity has no effect. A subsequent test confirms that the benefits of identifying with Europe extend most strongly to immigrants of European Union origin, although positive effects are observed toward non-European Union migrants as well.
This article tests the role of deliberation in potentially reducing the gender gap in knowledge. It compares gender differences in knowledge of both participants and non-participants before and after the Europolis deliberative event took place by making use of the difference in difference estimation method. Findings show that deliberation increases the political knowledge of participants (especially women) suggesting that it contributes to reducing the gender gap in knowledge by providing participants not only with information and awareness about the topics discussed but also with confidence when answering factual knowledge questions. These results suggest the need to conduct further research about the way in which information–rich contexts might reduce other potential inequalities in sources of knowledge.
The European Parliament (EP) has one of the highest proportions of women in its ranks, with over a third in 2009. Although previous research has pointed to the use of proportional representation (PR) in European elections as ‘friendlier’ to women, few have looked at differences in the types of PR rules in use in each country. In this article, we argue that the conventional wisdom according to which institutional design—the choice of electoral rules—should shape the composition of the EP does not hold, and suggest that the well-documented empirical connection between electoral rules and descriptive representation might in fact be an endogenous rather than a causal relationship.
Politics in the Council is Janus-faced. There is bargaining with identifiable winners and losers, yet the voting records show high levels of agreement. These two sides have almost exclusively been studied in isolation even though standard theoretical models of voting typically assume that actors’ behaviour is guided by their positions relative to the proposal and the status quo. By combining positional data and voting data, we evaluate to what extent voting is driven by salience-weighted issue-specific positions. Our results show that governments’ voting behaviour is guided by their issue-specific positions. The relationship between preference-based positions and votes is stronger when we impute values for the missing positions in the positional data. This illustrates the importance of cautious treatment of missing data in EU decision-making.
How can we explain the decline in support for the European Union (EU) and the idea of European integration after the onset of the great recession in the fall of 2007? Did the economic crisis and the austerity policies that the EU imposed—in tandem with the IMF—on several member countries help cause this drop? While there is some evidence for this direct effect of EU policies, we find that the most significant determinant of trust and support for the EU remains the level of trust in national governments. Based on cue theory and using concepts of diffuse and specific support, we find that support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy, which Europeans know far better than the remote political system of the EU. This effect, however, is somewhat muted for those sophisticated Europeans that are more knowledgeable about the EU and are able to form opinions about it independently of the national contexts in which they live. We also find that the recent economic crisis has led to a discernible increase in the number of those who are disillusioned with politics both at the national and the supranational level. We analyze 133 national surveys from 27 EU countries by estimating a series of cross-classified multilevel logistic regression models.
Within the last several years, new data have become available to test the various theoretical models of EU decision-making, and, in doing so, to assess actor influence. This article examines the extent to which the recent DEU and DEUII datasets provide sufficient information to distinguish between competing theoretical models of legislative decision-making, and accurately assess the power of the different branches of EU government. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to measurement error in these data. Once measurement error is accounted for, it becomes clear that these data do not provide sufficient information to distinguish between most models of legislative politics. Moreover, empirical models that fail to account for measurement error are likely to lead researchers to erroneous conclusions about actors’ legislative influence.
This study develops and tests three explanations of trust in the European Union. Following the logic of rationality, trust originates from evaluations about the (actual and perceived) performances and procedures of the European Union. Trust within the logic of identity trust depends on citizens’ emotional attachments to the European Union. According to the logic of extrapolation, trust is an extension of national trust and therefore unrelated to the European Union itself. We test these explanations and their interrelations in a multilevel analysis of Eurobarometer 71.3 and conclude that the logic of extrapolation is the strongest predictor of trust in the European Union. Although we also find some evidence to suggest that rational calculus matters, by-and-large, citizens seem to trust or distrust the European Union for reasons that are largely distinct from the Union itself.
Substantial empirical evidence suggests that voters cast their ballot not only by considering the different policy positions of parties or candidates, but also appear to pull candidates/parties they prefer closer to their own ideal position (‘assimilation’) while pushing candidates/parties they dislike, farther away (‘contrast’). These effects are called ‘projection effects’. We illustrate that voters’ perceptions of policy positions of candidates/parties are contaminated by non-spatial considerations. Building on data from the EES series, we empirically demonstrate that projection effects are substantively meaningful and statistically significant in elections to the European Parliament. We moreover distinguish between unsystematic projection bias that only depends on the closeness to a specific candidate or party and systematic projection bias that is also affected by party-, voter-, and context-specific determinants.
Despite the increased use of stakeholder consultations, little is known about their impact on the legislative process. We examine how consultation of external actors during policy preparation affects decision-making duration and efficiency. We test our predictions on EU legislative decision-making and we find that although stakeholder consultations in policy preparation may increase the democratic legitimacy of decision-making, they result in efficiency losses in the subsequent legislative processes. Hence, rather than smoothing the way for quick legislative reconciliation, consultations increase the transaction costs of subsequent bargaining by prolonging the time needed to form the necessary coalitions and reach legislative deals. However, despite the proliferation of different tools for involving external actors, we find no differences in legislative speed between open and restricted consultations.
This study examines the relationship between educational attainment and euroscepticism from 1973 to 2010. Existing research has shown that, driven by utilitarian considerations, political cues and questions of collective identity, education and euroscepticism are negatively related. However, as the process of European unification has progressed, all three factors have become more salient, so we expect an increasing effect of education on euroscepticism over time. Using 81 waves of the Eurobarometer survey in 12 European Union (EU) member states, our results show that the impact of education on euroscepticism has indeed increased, particularly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.
Degressive proportionality constitutes the main conceptual criterion to determine the composition of the European Parliament (EP). In reality, however, this concept entails serious practical problems as exemplified by the current distribution of seats in the EP. This article takes up the call and presents a new method for a better balanced seat allocation in the EP after the 2014 elections. Comparing with recent methods in the field, our results reveal that the method proposed yields a more balanced and juster parliamentary seat distribution among all European member states by joining the strengths of the existing methods and avoiding their weaknesses. In light of upcoming rounds of enlargement and possible amendments to the EP's internal rules of procedure and existing EU Treaties, we contend that our results are not only of interest to the academic world.
This article examines the informational advantages of interest group networking strategies and how these relate to the provision of policy-relevant information to EU decision-makers. Interest groups obtain a great deal of policy-relevant information through their network connections. In particular, weak tie networks are strong in terms of information sharing among network members. Well-informed groups are best positioned to provide much needed information to EU decision-makers and to thus influence the EU policy-making process. Using original survey and interview data, this article tests the extent to which weak tie strategies help interest groups provide information to the Commission, Parliament and Council. A central finding of this article is that strong ties, rather than weak ties, grant the most important informational advantages.
Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of concepts rooted in social identity for understanding citizen attitudes towards the European Union (EU). This article builds upon prior research by developing an argument that authoritarians are more likely to oppose the EU and to hold exclusionary social identity attitudes. Authoritarians, who have a predisposition towards order and conformity, are likely to oppose the EU as it threatens the established social and political order of the sovereign state and the dominant national culture. In addition, authoritarians are more likely to express exclusionary social identities. Analysis of survey data finds support for these claims and demonstrates that authoritarianism decreases support for the EU directly and indirectly through various indicators of social identity attitudes.
Descriptive studies on the European Union’s global image reveal generally favourable feelings towards the European Union on the part of citizens outside Europe. However, European Union perceptions vary considerably across countries. This article argues that these patterns can be analytically explained by taking context and individual factors into account. European Union behaviour and an individual’s supranationalist attitude should exert a substantial impact on citizens’ feelings. A multi-level model confirms the expectations. These findings imply practically that the behaviour of the European Union and other International Organizations shapes public opinion and that it might, in the future, negatively influence global public opinion towards the European Union.
Few political communication studies deal with the European Parliament during non-election times even though it takes decisions in a wide range of policy areas. This study examines the patterns and external drivers of European Parliament broadsheet coverage by analysing 2155 articles from six European Union countries during a routine period (2005–2007). Generally, it finds that the European Parliament receives regular coverage. However, developments in the domestic context also influence European Parliament news coverage. Public support for the European Union increases the number of reports about the European Parliament. While national elections do not compromise its news coverage, higher levels of party political contestation over the European Union and trust towards the national parliament lead to lower coverage. The implications are discussed with reference to the European Parliament’s democratic legitimacy.
How does ideological congruency affect the speed of legislative decision-making in the European Union? Despite the crucial importance of actor preferences, the effect of partisan alignments and ideological composition of the European institutions has largely been neglected. However, we argue that the ideological congruence between legislative bodies has an important effect on the duration of policy-making. We test our theoretical expectations based on a large new dataset on decision-making speed in the European Union using event history analysis. The findings confirm our theoretical claim indicating that the ideological distance between the European institutions slows down policy-making which has important implications for the problem-solving capacity of political systems more generally.
Does income inequality increase political backlash against European and global integration? This paper reports research suggesting that it can. The article analyses party opposition to and support for trade openness, European Union integration and general internationalism of political party platforms in advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. It finds that inequality tends to increase anti-globalization positions of parties, net of pro-globalization positions, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or levels of actual globalization. This effect, however, does depend on, and is diminished by, generous redistributive policies. These findings clarify socio-economic conditions underlying the backlash against political and economic globalization.
The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. The European Parliament is more successful in the post-Amsterdam period, when the Council decides by qualified majority voting, the rapporteur comes from a large party, the European Commission is supportive, and when national administrations are more involved in the implementation process than the Commission.