["Applied Cognitive Psychology, Volume 40, Issue 4, July/August 2026. ", "\nABSTRACT\nPrior research suggests that evidence‐inconsistent beliefs persist via belief‐driven motivated reasoning, biasing how people search out and evaluate evidence. However, studies of motivated reasoning are typically confounded in that those who hold evidence‐inconsistent beliefs differ from those who do not. We conducted two preregistered experiments separating beliefs from their correlates via a labelling manipulation. We recruited people who did and didn't believe in the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine, a debunked COVID‐19 treatment, and asked them to read evidence about either hydroxychloroquine or “Drug A.” Across both studies, self‐reported believers were more likely to endorse the clinical usage of hydroxychloroquine, but also of Drug A, and in Study 2, a non‐COVID‐related treatment. Our results suggest that the persistence of evidence‐inconsistent beliefs can reflect more than belief‐driven motivated reasoning. Research on evidence‐inconsistent beliefs should include neutral control conditions to assess the influence of factors correlated with belief.\n"]