["Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 43, Issue 1, Page 146-156, February 2026. ", "\nABSTRACT\nThis article deals with the moral evaluation of stigma. I respond to Euan Allison's recent critique of stigma, calling into question his major arguments for its wrongness. Allison's foundational premise is that stigma is wrong because it fails to treat the stigmatized as individuals. He accepts that stigma denies the autonomy of those it attaches to but concludes that its distinctive wrongness lies in the harm it does to their agency by limiting their ability to self‐present. I challenge these criticisms, arguing that stigma can actually be quite congenial to acknowledging the individuality and autonomy of the stigmatized, and questioning whether limitations on one's ability to self‐present are necessarily harms. I conclude by suggesting that stigma should be evaluated morally on different grounds than those Allison employs, such as the value of the ends it pursues and its ability to fulfill them.\n"]