["Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 43, Issue 1, Page 157-177, February 2026. ", "\nABSTRACT\nCultural cognition is the thesis that laypersons' factual beliefs about politically important issues are often shaped by their political values. The question, then, is whether a layperson who believes in anthropogenic climate change should doubt her beliefs insofar as they might be influenced by values. Cultural cognition raises concerns for the epistemic status of these beliefs and appears to threaten the viability of debunking strategies in contexts of expert disagreement. Such strategies consist in attributing bias to dissenters to rationally dismiss their views, but if laypersons are also biased, debunking may be self‐defeating. I shall refute this challenge on three grounds. First, there is controversy over whether the empirical literature on cultural cognition has genuinely identified a form of motivated reasoning, since the data can also be explained in non‐motivational, rational terms. Second, even if it has, this is not evidence that a particular individual is biased. Greater caution is needed when moving from statistical generalisations to individual cases. Finally, evidence of bias is not always evidence of error – something especially clear in the case of belief in anthropogenic climate change. The discussion allows me to explore the general sceptical import of the psychological literature on cultural cognition.\n"]